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Ethics of Clinical Science in a Public
Health Emergency: Drug Discovery
at the Bedside
Sarah J. L. Edwards, University College London
Clinical research under the usual regulatory constraints may be difficult or even impossible in a public health emergency.
Regulators must seek to strike a good balance in granting as wide therapeutic access to new drugs as possible at the same time
as gathering sound evidence of safety and effectiveness. To inform current policy, I reexamine the philosophical rationale for
restricting new medicines to clinical trials, at any stage and for any population of patients (which resides in the precautionary
principle), to show that its objective to protect public health, now or in the future, could soon be defeated in a pandemic. Providing
wider therapeutic access and coordinating observations and natural experiments, including service delivery by cluster (wedged
cluster trials), may provide such a balance. However, there are important questions of fairness to resolve before any such research
can proceed.
Keywords: research ethics, public health
Most discussion of ethics in a public health emergency fo-
cuses on questions of distribution of available resources,
and the main aim of current emergency planning is to es-
tablish a priority list to help decide who should get any
available treatments first (WHO 2007). With a couple of no-
table exceptions (London 2009; WHO 2009), there is little
consideration paid to the process(es) by which we might
gather scientifically robust evidence to support these dis-
tributive decisions. As a corollary of this neglect, we cannot
even be sure whether these first “lucky” recipients of new
treatments count technically as “research subjects” in the
same way as people enrolled in a formal Phase I trial. If
patients receiving new treatments are not, strictly speaking,
also research subjects, they cannot expect to enjoy the same
level of protective oversight that regulators provide within
the tightly formalized systems and institutional structures
that govern research (McRae et al. 2011; WHO 2009). In any
case, having decided what counts as formal research, and
thus what formal protection the systems of research regu-
lation can offer, running a program of clinical science takes
c© Sarah J.L. Edwards
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1. It is useful to note that the widest “therapeutic access” to newmedicines, which might mean abandoning the quest for robust research
evidence, does not imply that regulation of investigational new drugs must also be abandoned. Conversely, it might also be possible to
collect robust research data in a completely unregulated market for medicines. In this article, I am interested in showing how regulators
might consider the balance between research and practice in a public health crisis.
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a considerable amount of logistic organization and time in
order to execute it efficiently and effectively.
Regulation of investigational new drugs often means
that access to them is tightly restricted to a lengthy research
program unless and until there is sufficient evidence that
they are safe and efficacious. Such research evidence is usu-
ally sought through a series of three phases of clinical re-
search that might test any given drug for its effects in any
one condition.However, in somecases, theprocess bywhich
we approach clinical science and its regulation must adapt
to the circumstances in question. For example, following the
rise of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) introduced new rules, apparently to widen
therapeutic access to investigational new drugs (National
Academy of Sciences 1991). While the case of HIV provides
a precedent for expanding access to investigational treat-
ments to some extent, manywouldwelcomeways to widen
access even further without also compromising on research
evidence (National Academy of Sciences 1991).1 My task in
this article is to find an acceptable balance, for regulators,
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between providing very ill patients with new therapeutic
treatments and pursuing scientific evidence of safety and
effectiveness in the most challenging circumstances imag-
inable, namely, a pandemic. Given that the scope of scien-
tific inquiry is greatly compromised by these circumstances,
notwithstanding the conclusion of the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) report in 2009, there might well be spe-
cial questions of ethics and regulation relating to this sort
of research. Some, more standard, types of research might
not be feasible or they might be incompatible with other
nonpharmaceutical measures such as geographical contain-
ment, or even quarantine, to curtail the spread of a commu-
nicable disease. There are thus many questions associated
with how clinical science might ethically be conducted in
a pandemic, such as when consent might be waived in an
emergency, but here I wish to focus on what I consider to
be the prior issue of how regulators should strike a good
balance between therapeutic access and scientific endeavor.
It is worth noting that, to some extent and in some cases
such as pandemic flu, it might be possible to discover new
compounds and tests new drugs under tightly controlled
and managed circumstances (as current rules require). 2
However, pandemic flu is not the only public health emer-
gency we could encounter. We could encounter a rather
more unexpected threat, from a pathogen that has never
been seen before, for which we have no known effective
treatment, and against which we have no way of forearm-
ing ourselves. A good example is provided by the severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002–2003.
SARS almost became a pandemic: The WHO 2004 report
lists 8,096 known infected cases and 774 deaths. In the case
of SARS, because the pathogen was new, we had very little
time to prepare against it and the disease was already ram-
pant before we had any idea what it was, let alone had any
effective treatments for it.3 More recently, a new SARS-like
virus of the coronavirus family has beendiscovered in Saudi
Arabia in 2012, although it is not thought to be spread eas-
ily, so travel restrictions have not (yet) been imposed (BBC
2012).
To set the scene in more depth, in the second section of
this article I rehearse current regulation of new health tech-
nologies in general terms and show that clinical research
under existing regulatory constraints (including the FDA
schemes of expedited development and parallel track) may
be difficult or even impossible in a public health emergency.
In the third section, I reexamine the rationale for restricting
newmedicines to clinical trials (at any stage of the develop-
ment process and for any patient population) to show that
its objective to protect public health, now or in the future,
could soon be defeated in a pandemic. Furthermore, I sug-
gest that the method used to achieve such a public health
objective (which places a burden of scientific proof on re-
searchers to gather evidence of safety, and in most cases
2. I thank James Wilson, whose teaching notes filled gaps in my
knowledge of pandemics.
3. In addition, the fact that the Chinese government failed to notify
the WHO about the spreading virus until it was much too late
added to the problems.
efficacy, before making a new treatment widely available)
may require judicial application. However, in the fourth
section, I discuss why some regulation of clinical research,
despite the extreme circumstances of a pandemic, is ethi-
cally required. In light of these points, in the fifth section, I
explore how regulationmight offer a good balance between
the need to widen therapeutic access to new treatments and
the need to gain scientific information. I suggest that the use
of research designs such as cluster randomized controlled
trials (CRCTs) might be suitable in this instance. Random-
ized cluster trials can be used to introduce a new therapy
in a stepwise fashion to the population at large without re-
stricting it first to a series of trials and only then distributing
it more widely. Those clusters waiting for the therapy act as
controls in the meantime. The distinction between research
and practice thus falls away, at least for the purposes of
therapeutic access. However, as I show in the sixth section,
there are important moral limits to the use of alternative
research designs, as described earlier, especially in such a
crisis. These must be carefully considered before mounting
clinical research alongwhatmay becomepolitically divisive
lines. These limitations, however, might not be prohibitive
in the end, but serious attention should, nonetheless, be
paid to how social conflict and attendant health inequalities
could be mitigated by their use.
EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
AND ITS LIMITS
Potential drug candidates, once identified, need to be clini-
cally evaluated. Before any new compound may legally be
“tested” in a human being, however, regulators generally
ask to see extensive preclinical information which includes
safety and dose testing on animals.4 Many countries regu-
late new health technologies thereafter by restricting use of
them to clinical trials (to check that they are safe and effica-
cious) before licensing them for sale on the openmarket. For
example, in the United States the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) and in the United Kingdom the Medicines
and Health Care Products Regulatory Authority (MHRA)
require all new drugs, and many new medical devices, to
undergo a series of clinical trials before they will consider
granting a marketing license. Phase I is commonly a rel-
atively small study, usually involving healthy volunteers,
to determine which dose of a new drug is tolerated by the
human body. Only when the new drug is known to have se-
vere adverse side effects, as in the case of chemotherapeutic
agents, are patients recruited, and even then, only when all
other treatment options have been exhausted. Patients are
usually recruited at Phase II (when the first tests of efficacy
are run) and then again at Phase III (in a much larger cohort
to gain statistically more precise estimates of a new drug’s
efficacy as compared with a control substance that could be
a placebo).
Sometimes, surveillance studies are run, after the new
product is marketed, to evaluate longer term safety and
4. These rules on preclinical testing may be relaxed for lifesaving
treatments under the FDA’s policy following the AIDs epidemic
(National Academy of Sciences 1990).
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effectiveness. For some devices, many tests of a mecha-
nism’s function can be run in the laboratory and the effects
of such devices in a human can more reliably be predicted
than is the case for new drugs. For this reason, some im-
plantable devices may be marketed without undergoing
such exhaustive clinical testing. In the circumstances of a
public health crisis, where a disease is both communicable
and deadly, the use of pharmaceutical treatments is likely to
offer the best approach, so I focus on them in the following
discussion.
To develop a new drug from scratch and test it accord-
ing to the usual rules, as already described, could take up
to 15 years to reach fruition (Kaitin 2010). However effi-
cient this process may be, many people might die before a
new treatment could be fully tested, let alone subsequently
made available to everyone. Moreover, the general chaos,
public panic, decay of infrastructure, andhealth careworker
sickness make it very difficult for us to control conditions
sufficiently to allow robust research such as we might need
to gather valid results. These research conditions could even
be pragmatically incompatible with other measures used to
control the spread of the disease.
That said, there are currently three main ways in which
individual patients might try drugs as therapy in a pan-
demic. The first is under what is sometimes called the doc-
tor’s therapeutic privilege, but this legal justification relies
on the drug in question having been tested for some other
condition and having been licensed for this other particular
use on grounds that it is safe and efficacious. The second is
under compassionate or “named patient” access to a new
drug. While interesting, we will see that the philosophi-
cal basis for justifying individual access to investigational
treatments will not stand up to the circumstances of a pub-
lic health crisis. The third is through the FDA’s expedited
or parallel track schemes, although direct or therapeutic ac-
cess to the investigational treatment is still either delayed
for most patients until after Phase II or denied if the patient
is eligible for an ongoing conventional clinical trial.
Let us examine the therapeutic privilege. When faced
with a severe threat to public health and many ill patients,
much experimentation would probably be done by over-
worked general practitioners. These doctorsmight try cock-
tails of existing and licensed drugs. To count as a plausible
treatment at all, there must be some rationale for trying it,
with this rationale coming from inferential or analogous rea-
soning. A physician might infer from his or her theoretical
knowledge of biochemistry or physiology that an existing
drug might help in these new circumstances. For example,
a doctor once tried Viagra on critically ill babies with respi-
ratory problems, knowing that enlarging the blood vessels
would increase oxygen supply to the brain (BBC 2007). Or
any doctor, faced with a pandemic, might have previously
observed beneficial clinical effects on similar symptoms in
patients with similar conditions and then seek to apply
this knowledge analogously. For example, neurologists and
neuroscientists using deep brain stimulation (DBS) to treat
Parkinson’s disease noticed not only its effects on inhibit-
ingmovement but also its effects onmood (Scicurious 2012).
Deep brain stimulation is now being tested for depression
and other mental health conditions (Lozano et al. 2012).
And indeed, the routine use of Viagra for male impotence
was discovered accidentally by observing clinical effects in
monkeys while testing it for angina (Terrett et al. 1996).
With the increased use of “personalized” medicine and
treatment regimens that are based on particular genetic pro-
files, the scope for medical advance for everyone during a
pandemic through the therapeutic privilegemay be increas-
ingly limited. These drugswould be licensed (andmanufac-
tured) for use in only small subpopulations of patients with
the right genetic profile. Even if genetics did not preclude
wider application, the drugs would be in short supply. Be-
fore we can concentrate on the challenge of manufacture on
a grand scale, we must first explore further possibilities for
science that seem to leave less to chance.
During a pandemic, for which little can be tested before
the event, it is crucial to thinkhow the regulatory restrictions
on therapeutic access to new treatments might be relaxed
in a way we might initially think is analogous to the com-
passionate access that is allowed by standard regulatory
rules in an emergency situation. Where there is no threat to
public health, some individuals are allowed access to exper-
imental treatments on a compassionate and named patient
basis, even if their safety and efficacy have not been fully
demonstrated, provided that there is some preclinical infor-
mation to support the rationale for their use (Edwards 2006;
National Academy of Sciences 1991). The level of evidence
required to provide lawful treatment may thus be lowered
in some “exceptional” cases. The use of the word “excep-
tional” here is contentious even in these cases where a few
individual patients who are very ill seek special prior and
priority access before a marketing license has been granted
for all similar patients. The word “exceptional” could re-
fer to just one patient or it could refer to a single set but
comprising several patients. I will continue to use the word
for convenience only. In standard cases of an emergency,
we thus accept that some individuals should have access
to untested treatments on a compassionate basis. In view
of the unusual needs of the community in a public health
emergency, it might seem that we should simply extend
therapeutic access to everyone in that community as they
are all in the midst of an emergency. Under such circum-
stances, any regulatory restrictions on trying new drugs
would then be so relaxed that they would disappear.
However, we cannot simply stretch the moral justifica-
tion for treating a particular individual to the treatment of
many individuals at a population level. This is because the
rule of rescue,whichwemight use to support untested treat-
ments for an individual, collapses as we introduce more,
perhaps unidentifiable, individuals. In any case, the rule of
rescue is far from being a normative rule and is more of-
ten discussed in the context of providing expensive care to
an individual against the results of a cost–benefit analysis
(Sheehan 2007). The rule of rescue could, at best, be thought
to symbolize what a compassionate and humanitarian soci-
etymight value in extremis under these financially restricted
circumstances. Perhaps more usefully in the circumstances
September, Volume 13, Number 9, 2013 ajob 5
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currently under consideration, that is, a pandemic, the rule
of rescue could be thought to indicate when professional
duties to individuals and to groups are clearly differenti-
ated. For example, professional duties in public health and
in intensive care are clearly distinguished in this way.5More
often, the rule of rescue reflects our psychological instinct
to wade in and help the closest person who is in dire need
of our assistance (Sheehan 2007). Interestingly, there is no
law requiring us to intervene and rescue, except perhaps in
France, mainly due to the inefficiencies such a rule would
introduce (Posner 1981). We might find that no one takes
on the role of health worker, for example, in order to avoid
situations inwhich such a dutywould require such a person
to act.
Following the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and com-
plaints from patients with the disease, for which no treat-
ment then existed, the FDA revised its policy on therapeutic
access to investigational treatments (National Academy of
Sciences 1991). During the development of zidovudine, for
example, the FDA implemented policies to speed up the
more restrictive trial phase. Interestingly, these are simply
policies with no new regulation as such, since they were
supposed to be compatible with existing rules. However,
as we have seen, the philosophical justification for thera-
peutic access at an individual level is different from the
philosophical justification for population-level restrictions
on access to new medicines, which is principally to bene-
fit patients in the future through gathering evidence. The
particular FDA policy change of interest here, expedited
development, is to remove the requirement for Phase III
evaluation of drugs intended to treat life-threatening and
severely debilitating diseases. Earlier trial phases, however,
would then have to be designed with controls and proba-
bly extended in numbers to compensate for the absence of
a separate Phase III. Importantly, therapeutic access would
be restricted to research during the early phases. Further,
postmarketing surveillance studies might also be required
to supplement these data. While this means that patients as
a group might have access to treatment sooner, expedited
developmentdoes not solve the issue froman individual pa-
tient’s perspective since the patient might still be too ill to
wait for routine access after licensing, whenever that might
be. Depending on the speedwithwhich a pandemicwere to
take hold and the sheer number of patients in dire need of
some treatment during these early phases of development,
there may be many patients in the position of being denied
therapeutic access because of these research constraints.
Similarly, the parallel track policy (again, developed by
the FDA in response to the AIDS epidemic) makes selected
investigational treatments available but only to HIV pa-
tients who are deemed ineligible for an ongoing conven-
tional clinical trial. Under this policy, treatment outside re-
search is allowed only once Phase II has been approved, and
then only if Phase I provides expanded information (e.g., on
different doses) and if patients can still be monitored for ad-
5. I thank Jonathan Wolff for helping me clarify this point in con-
versation.
verse effects.6 If eligible for a clinical trial, then a patient
cannot simply choose to have the investigational treatment
and so such treatmentmaybedelayed. In a pandemic,many
patients may die before Phase II is approved and so, again,
bedenied therapeutic access becauseof research constraints.
In sum, the policies of both expedited and parallel track re-
strict access to investigational treatments in order to gain
scientific knowledge for patients in the future. The philo-
sophical justification for these policies was not made at the
time when the new rules were adopted by the FDA, and for
a pandemic I suggest they do not go far enough. This pro-
vides the motivation for further attention and regulatory
work. To think about how regulators should respond to the
special conditions of a pandemic, we must review the phi-
losophy behind any restrictive regulation of investigational
new drugs.
RESTRICTIVE REGULATION AND UNDUE CAUTION
Following public health problems, first with elixir sulfanil-
amide in 1937 and then with thalidomide in 1962, investi-
gational new drugs have become increasingly regulated. It
is important to note, though, that the drugs involved were
not designed to treat deadly and communicable diseases.
Implicit in all subsequent regulation (which restricts access
to investigational new drugs to clinical trials to a greater or
lesser extent) is the idea that we should use them only with
caution, as there is scientific uncertainty about their safety.
This philosophy rests on using the “precautionary princi-
ple.” The principle requires a certain level of evidence of
safety before members of the public are exposed to threats
of “serious or irreversible damage” (United Nations En-
vironment Programme 1992). However, caution does not
mean paralysis, as is made clear by the program’s principle
15: “Lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effectivemeasures to prevent en-
vironmental degradation” (UNEP 1992, Principle 15). This
original description of the precautionary principle in the
Rio Declaration has, however, since been changed to “when
the scientific bases are insufficient or when there is some un-
certainty” (EC, 2000, 23 [italics added]). As Holm andHarris
(1999) observe, to require proof of safety before any new
technology can be introduced does not permit scientific ad-
vance at all.
To accommodate this problem, Article 5.7 allows regu-
latorymeasures “where relevant scientific evidence is insuf-
ficient” to demonstrate the safety of a product (World Trade
Organization [WTO] 1994, 72), but there is an obligation on
regulators to take steps to obtain sufficient evidence. The
account of the precautionary principle that was issued by
participants at the 1998 Wingspread conference took this
idea further and proposed that the burden of proof should
not, however, lie with the regulators, although in theory
it could. It should fall on the proponents of the activity to
6. Patients must be unable to participate in related clinical trials
either because they do not meet the scientific eligibility criterion,
perhaps on account of being too sick, or because their participation
would create undue hardship.
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prove that it is safe, rather than on the regulators to prove
that it is unsafe. While the precautionary principle instructs
us to delay the introduction of potentially risky new prac-
tices inorder topreventharm,delaymay itself causeharm in
the form of lost opportunities to prevent disease and death
(Harris and Holm 1999). The precautionary principle nec-
essarily privileges an often indeterminate future risk over,
possibly less apparent, current benefits. This difficulty was
dramatically illustrated by the death of several thousand
people in Peru in 1991 caused by removing chlorine from
the municipal water supply after a risk assessment (by the
U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency) emphasized the cal-
culated small risk from chlorination products but failed to
address the greater risk of untreatedwater (Anderson 1991).
Although the precautionary principle had little weight at
that time, and was not explicitly used in the decision, this
case is a clear illustration of the risks of its inappropriate
application. Furthermore, in addition to downplaying any
clear and present risks of not using new technologies, the
precautionary principle ignores the possibility that future
advances may reduce or eliminate any future risks.
The case of a pandemic might be an extreme example of
this problemwhere threats of serious or irreversible damage
are current and actual. The opportunity costs of restricting
access to new technologies now in order to protect people
in the future are clear: many people would die, and quickly.
On closer inspection, the case of a pandemic might be spe-
cial since the logic of the position already described does
not withstand analysis. Future harm might not even be an
empirical possibility. It is true that the human race has sur-
vived pandemics sincewe started living in close settlements
and then towns and cities. We have survived the bubonic
plague and deadly strains of influenza. Large genetic sub-
populations of the human race, however, did not survive
the Black Death (BBC World Service 2001). Our future as a
species is in some sense contingent on how we act during
a pandemic. There might be some chance of alleviating the
threat through using technological advance, so any delay in
gathering evidence could be catastrophic for some groups
if not for everyone.
This is not to say that new medicines do not carry any
risks at all, only that the benefits may be more apparent,
given the alternatives, especially when there seems nothing
or little to lose. Depending on how health states are valued,
new drugs could do more harm than good even when in-
dividual patients are desperately ill and expect otherwise
to die. I develop this point in the next section to show why
some regulation of new medicines is necessary. For exam-
ple, there are reports of patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(which is both serious andprogressive) beingworse off after
having received embryonic stem cells (as part of research)
than theywould have beenwithout any intervention (Freed
et al. 2001). However, if we make the cost–benefit trade-off
between certain death and the chance of a lingering life
of poor health, the precautionary principle (which skews
this trade-off against uncertain future harms) should itself
be applied with caution. The precautionary principle, in
general, serves as a useful check that any commercial in-
terests are not served at the expense of public health, but
it does not adjudicate between choices both of which are
intended to promote public health. That said, it is worth
noting that there are other precautionary measures avail-
able to the regulator, besides restricting new medicines to
clinical trials, such as close monitoring and meticulous re-
porting to reduce uncertainty. Before exploring how clinical
science could proceed in a pandemic (with due caution), I
first establish why some regulation of investigational new
drugs remains necessary.
WHY SOME REGULATION IS STILL NECESSARY
Even under the extreme circumstances of a public health
crisis andwithout appealing to the precautionary principle,
it is evident that it might not, in fact, serve the public inter-
est to allow would-be physician-researchers to try just any-
thing to see where it leads, no matter what the cost–benefit
calculation says for an individual patient. There are many
reasons for this, but to stress that the thesis advanced in this
article does not imply a wholly unregulated environment,
I discuss the need for regulation based on experimental,
current risk. As in the usual researcher–subject relation-
ship, there remains an asymmetry of risk in favor of the
researcher, which requires external oversight and supervi-
sion (Edwards 2009). These risks are associated with using
treatments that produce unknown clinical effects. One rea-
son for regulationof newmedicines is that the threat of court
action, through common law, is generally not sufficient to
counteract fully the vested interests a researchermight have
in his or her project, the pursuit of which might expose his
or her subjects to greater risks (Edwards 2009). The most
harmful outcome for the researcher is usually financial cost,
loss of reputation or even a career, or even imprisonment
(at worst). In the chaos of a pandemic, wayward researchers
might never have to answer for malpractice. If the effects
were serious enough, the subject could die from an experi-
mental treatment.
However, where a disease is directly communicable,
physician-scientists will themselves be on the front line for
infection, and may place themselves at severe risk by see-
ing patients. It may be dangerous to perform humanitar-
ian work without full infection control (as offered in clinics
designed for such research work) requiring sterile environ-
ments, airlocks, and protective suits and masks.7 If the risk
to the researcher is reduced by the use of special equipment,
7. This was a worry during SARS, but it will be a more severe
worry during a severe pandemic flu outbreak: “Evenwith excellent
infection control practices, in the absence of vaccine, attack rates of
greater than 10% are likely to occur among health care workers.
Viral shedding of influenza occurs 1 to 2 days before symptoms are
noted and can continue for 7 days after symptoms begin. Infants
and immune-compromised individualsmay shed forweeks, which
makes transmission of influenza evenmore difficult to control both
in the hospital and the community. In contrast, the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus shedding peaks at 7 to
10 days after symptoms begin, making this disease more easily
contained with current infection control practices” (Cinti 2005, 63).
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the subject will again be exposed to greater risks than the re-
searcher (whose vested interests might remain without reg-
ulatory oversight). The preferential use of protective suits to
protect health workers involved in researchmay raise ques-
tions of a political nature, which could, in turn, create social
conflict andmistrust in the institution of research. However,
if we were to accept arguments in favor of providing health
workers with priority access to new therapies (so they are
in a position to help treat many others in turn), they may
themselves be the “subjects” of new treatments by virtue of
being first.8
Having shownwhy some regulatory oversight is neces-
sary in conditions of a pandemic, I next explore how thera-
peutic access to investigational new drugs might be further
expanded beyond the policies of expedited development or
parallel track without abandoning the need for good evi-
dence of safety.
TOWARD NATURAL EXPERIMENTATION
Even given the luxury of a ready infrastructure and poten-
tial drug candidates, there seems little room for the full se-
ries of conventional clinical trials culminating in a random-
ized controlled trial. Such trials, while scientifically ideal in
other circumstances to reduce selection bias, might be dif-
ficult or impossible to run in a pandemic. There are several
reasons for this, each of which may be sufficient to make
a conventional trial undesirable. First, as discussed earlier,
it would take considerable time to complete formal testing
even to Phase II, whatever level of statistical significance
we were to accept (for speed) and whatever outcomes were
measured (for convenience). Second, when no known treat-
ment exists against which to compare a new therapy, any
control substance would have to be a placebo. If a stan-
dard treatment is available but is known to be ineffective,
then it technically counts as a placebo for the sake of ther-
apeutic access to health care.9 However, though the topic is
largely outside the scope of this article, it is noted that when
effective treatments exist (and have been stockpiled, as in
the case of pandemic flu) an active control could be used.
In cases of individual emergencies where there is no com-
municable disease and where there is no alternative active
therapy, placebo or ineffective treatment controls are indeed
controversial. The problem stems from the possibility of a
doctor denying a dying patient the last chance of benefit,
which seems too cruel for physicians to countenance even
when they are also scientists (Snowdon et al. 1997; Truog
1993; Worrall 2008). When a medically qualified researcher
denies a patient a risky treatment that could work when the
alternative is certain death, there is legal precedent to sug-
gest that experimental treatment may be ethical and lawful
(Edwards 2006). Indeed, theHighCourt in England ruled in
favor of allowing doctors to try an experimental treatment
8. While I do notwish to be drawn into a discussion about the ethics
of self-experimentation as such, it is perhaps enough to acknowl-
edge that regulation is still important when there are unequal risks
to researchers and subjects, whoever they might be.
9. Without perhaps any beneficial placebo effect.
(the drug pensotan polysulfate [PPS] injected directly into
the brain) on a patient with variant Creutzfeldt–Jacob dis-
ease (vCJD; BBC 2002). For a physician to accept randomiza-
tion, albeit in a blinded fashion, of the allocation of a placebo
or a new treatment, the physician-researcher may already
be violating duty of care as he or she is not in equipoise,
and could simply select the new drug for the patient (or
hedge as the HIV patients did in the corrupted AZT trials)
to put the individual’s interests first (National Academy of
Sciences 1991). If, however, an effective standard treatment
exists, then a conventional randomized controlled trial us-
ing an active control could be ethical, but the circumstances
of a pandemic might make it impossible, as I will show.
Third, we may not wish to put case and control subjects
in close vicinity under the care of the same researcher for
fear of further spreading the disease. Fourth, a conventional
randomized trial is scientifically important only when the
clinicallyworthwhile effect ismoderate but nonetheless sig-
nificant. In the case of a deadly pandemic, the outcome of
interest would have very great significance, that is, many
lives saved.
It seems clear, therefore, that we need to rethink the
design of research in these difficult circumstances in order
to accommodate the need to provide as wide a therapeutic
access to promising new treatments as possible (even be-
yond the immediate research population). We need some-
how to combine the practices of research and routine care
(which are otherwise thought to be in contrast or even to be
mutually exclusive, given standard regulatory restrictions
on access). Observational work, or natural experiments in
the field, may become more important. A simple anec-
dote about the successful treatment of one patient might
be enough to warrant trying it on another, and so on, until
there are enoughobservational data available to justifymore
widespread use. As many patients could be dying, without
treatment, any reversal of fortune would suggest, if not es-
tablish, a dramatic effect and so form a scientific rationale
for further investigation. With more lives saved, confidence
in the newdrugwould increase.Once anewdrug appears to
work and it is available to many patients, then more robust
observational datamight be collected andpooled.10 The best
information in these conditions may be far from the clean
aggregate data from a conventional randomized controlled
trial and may start as a string of promising anecdotes or a
“case series.”
Manufacturing a sufficient quantity of any new drug
might itself take time, so the drugmay become available for
distribution only gradually, allowing researchers and doc-
tors to adapt their approach to their accumulating clinical
observations. At any point, another new treatment might
be identified or the drug currently being distributed might
have to be discarded (either because of severe side effects or
because of apparent inefficacy) or the recommended dose
10. Note that a dramatic effect would not, in any case, require a
large randomized controlled trial to become apparent. For example,
we did not need a randomized trial of aspirin to observe its large
clinical effects. Randomized trials are usually only ever a epistemic
necessity when seeking moderate yet worthwhile effects.
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might change quickly. Natural experiments of many differ-
ent drugs simultaneously may be based on a quasi-random
allocation with a flexible analysis. In this vein, Bayesian
techniques might be better able than alternative statistics
to cope with analyzing rapidly changing technologies and
providing meaningful data (Lilford et al. 2000). Comparing
regimens in a changing and chaotic environment will be
essential.
Cooperativemethods for trying out new treatments and
for sharing epidemiological and effectiveness data seem
crucial (Langat et al. 2011). However, the prospects for shar-
ing data between countries may be more limited than we
might imagine, even with coordination provided by the
WHO.11 A lot of the information flows informally, but the
formal sharing of confidential documents has previously
proved impossible. With time, there might be formal agree-
ments in place to facilitate sharing.
Any regulatory decisions based on the precautionary
principle would thus be provisional, whichmeans that they
should be kept under active review andmodifiedwhen fur-
ther information that reduces uncertainty becomes avail-
able. At the beginning of a possible outbreak, politicians
may not realize the full extent of the problem and may be
reluctant to take draconian measures. With novel diseases,
all relevant nonpharmaceutical precautions may be taken
first until there is sufficient evidence to allow their relax-
ation.Here, the precautionary principlemight refer to social
organisation rather than the use of new technologies. For
this purpose, health workers and law enforcement agencies
need to understand the scale of the problem through social
control and basic surveillance. By tracking the incidence of
cases, they will learn about the mechanism by which the
infection is spread and how quickly it takes hold. The need
to stop the spread of a new pathogen might persuade re-
searchers and politicians to restrict freedom of movement.
International travel associated with affected regions might
be shut down (which is what the WHO recommended dur-
ing the SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada, much to the
distress of the politicians concerned with maintaining in-
ternational trade and protecting their economy). In some
cases, physical containment is still the onlyway tomanage a
public health emergency. Ebola, for example, is confronted
simply by isolating the community affected and allowing
the disease to run its course (Calain 2009).
11. Professor Neil Ferguson (Director, MRC Centre for Outbreak
Analysis and Modelling) warned the UK Science and Technology
Committee for Parliament that “while Governments and countries
are happy to share analysis—their view of the situation—they are
rarely willing to share the detailed data they are collecting in real
time, or at least some of it. . . . We had very detailed data from the
US CDC, data fromMexico and other countries. We couldn’t share
it with the other partners we were working with. We could only
share a kind of synthesis. . . . It was not somuch of an issue last year
because it was relatively mild, but there were instances where, had
we been dealing with something more serious, it could have posed
some problems and we could have lost some efficiency about that
inability to share raw data.”
With these two considerations in mind, controlled re-
search (as far as it might be possible and ethical in a pan-
demic)might be advanced by usingwedged cluster designs
(Edwards et al. 1999; Edwards et al. 2012). A new investi-
gational vaccine or other treatment would be introduced to
selected groups at a chosen time with those waiting for the
treatment acting as control groups. As more of the drug is
manufactured, groups acting temporarily as control groups
could be included in the study. Some groups will not re-
ceive the treatment immediately and, as I will show, the
process by which the groups are selected and then assigned
to treatment raises issues of fairness.
For ease of delivery, allocation of newmedicines is usu-
ally then determined by geography or service supply. New
treatments could be delivered more efficiently to larger
numbers through existing infrastructure and routine ser-
vices such as a water supply, although this is contentious as
it draws traditional ideas of research ethics such as informed
consent into question (Edwards et al. 1999; Sabin et al. 2008).
There is not the same issue of consent in individual-cluster
trials where the treatment is given separately to each indi-
vidual once the relevant cluster has been assigned to a trial
arm (Edwards et al. 1999).
In this way, it is possible to achieve as wide a ther-
apeutic access as possible while collecting research data.
The results obtained by such trials reflect the treatment’s
safety and effectiveness (which is the treatment’s effects un-
der real-world conditions) rather than its efficacy (which is
the treatment’s effects under the artificial laboratory condi-
tions, simply to establish cause and effect). To reduce the
scientific issue of selection bias in allocation, it is possible to
randomize the intervention to clusters (CRCTs).
Furthermore, cluster trials, whether randomized con-
trolled or small pilots, fit well with other nonpharmaceuti-
cal strategies in a pandemic. While there is very little robust
evidence on the effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions themselves for the control of public health emer-
gencies, they will prove invaluable and necessary for the
purpose of gathering controlled data about the effects of
pharmacological advances. The collection of high-quality
clustered data for research may thus be a useful side ef-
fect of geographical containment. In this way, major non-
pharmaceutical strategies (those of physical and hence so-
cial distancing or isolation) could enhance our capacity for
pharmacological advances. Once the problem is recognized,
and in the absence of epidemiological knowledge, the first
defense is quarantine. This might seem pragmatically easy
since patients who are very ill will be confined in intensive
care.
In addition, physicians’ professional duty of care to each
individual patient can remain intact and they can follow the
rule of rescue, as described earlier, without compromising
the wider public health effort. With cluster designs, there
will be no single physician-scientist handing out a drug to
one patient and then refusing to treat the next in line (Sabin
et al. 2008).
We might argue that more, rather than less, evidence
of safety is required before the cluster trial starts, as more
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people would be affected at once and in a less controlled
environment. However, each cluster could contain as small
a number of individuals as allowed by the methodolog-
ical techniques and as advisable in light of the preclini-
cal evidence, and individual subjects within each cluster
could be recruited sequentially to manage the risk as well
as is possible in the circumstances. Such an approach might
sound very much like a traditional Phase I trial. However,
the crucial difference is that individuals are recruited from
predefined clusters rather than the general patient pop-
ulation. There is no methodological reason why clusters
should not comprise different numbers of individuals. In-
deed, there are already recognized methods that could in-
corporate arbitrary clusters, for example, using generalized
estimating equations (GEE) or using a robust and automatic
calculation of standard errors in STATA.12
After the crisis has been averted, it will also be impor-
tant to monitor the effects of any new drugs that have been
distributed. This will be a form of longer term surveillance
akin to the study of ill health after natural disasters or com-
mercial accidents, such as a leak fromanuclear power plant.
Such surveillance is easier when directed at a community
or population rather than at diverse and disparately lo-
cated individuals. For example, it has only been through
longer term surveillance following the swine flu scare of
2009/2010 that the questionable effects of the “swine flu
jab” (Pandemrix) have come to light (CDC 2010). Links to
rare cases of narcolepsy, a disorder that causes people to
fall asleep suddenly and unexpectedly, have been reported,
mainly from Finland and Sweden but also from Iceland
and the United Kingdom. A nonrandomized study of chil-
dren, some of whom had been vaccinated with Pandemrix,
suggested that it carries a 6- to 13-fold increase in risk of
narcolepsy (CDC 2010). Overall, it has now been given to
more than 31 million people worldwide and, because of
the potential seriousness of the H1N1 infection, Pandemrix
remains a licensed alternative for children (at the time of
writing). At least, however, the effects have been reported,
so furtherwork canbeorganized through themedicines reg-
ulators. This was not so in the wake of the SARS outbreak.
“After the SARS outbreak in 2003, thousands of patients
were treated with agents of unproven efficacy and definite
toxicity; data on these agents’ efficacywere not gathered. To
prevent this situation from repeating itself, we must be pre-
pared to conduct prospective, randomized controlled trials
in the event of future outbreaks of novel pathogens” (Muller
et al. 2004). While the appeal to gather surveillance data is
laudable, the randomized trials to which Muller refers may
be feasible and, arguably, ethical only using cluster designs.
However, there may be moral and political concerns
about the use of cluster designs, concerns that could, if
mounted without careful forethought and governance, be
exacerbated by features of the pandemic itself. This is due to
resultant inequalities or commercial exploitation, or both.
12. I thank David Spiegelhalter for his insights on incorporating
arbitrary clusters.
TRUST AND FAIRNESS IN CLUSTER TRIALS
In nonemergency circumstances there are potential prob-
lems with using randomized cluster designs in which clus-
ters are bounded by socially divisive fault lines (Conrad and
Edwards 2011), and any risks associated with consequent
social tensions are only amplified by the special features of
a public health emergency (London 2011). It is particularly
important to maintain the community’s trust in social insti-
tutions during a pandemic if there is to be any semblance of
law and social order. However, two aspects of testing new
drugs using CRCTsmight erode this trust. One problem, ex-
acerbating inequalities, is inherent to the design itself, while
the other, profiteering, is only associated with involving in-
dustry. Financial exploitation is not the only problematic
form of exploitation possible, but we can nevertheless use-
fully discuss it in isolation, since it could be subject to a form
of governance that could be organized in advance of a pan-
demic. In the last analysis, abuse of political powermayonly
be resolved, in practice, after the event when governments
are brought to account for their actions. With commercial
interests at play, it is not obvious how industry can legit-
imately be involved without inviting exploitative practice
but there is arguably greater scope for prior analysis and
governance by government itself.
Group Inequalities
We have seen that people are divided into groups, prior
to any consideration of research, in order to contain the
disease within defined geographical areas. However, clus-
ters formed for the purposes of running controlled research
would have to be compatible with strategies for social iso-
lation. Depending on how local communities are formed,
providing access to promising new therapies sequentially
according to geographically defined clusters may exacer-
bate any preexisting social inequalities.
Manymajor theories in political philosophy consider in-
equalities to bebad in themselves, and focus either on avoid-
ing them (by strategies such as egalitarianism) or on giving
special priority to worse-off groups (using techniques such
as prioritarianism). Inequalities may also lead to other bad
outcomes, including mistrust in government or prejudice
(Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006).
Randomization has, in some cases, been used first as
a fair method of distributing scarce resources in nonemer-
gency conditions and as a method for adding scientifically
valuable research (Edwards and Kirchin 2002). But CRCTs
could exacerbate existing health inequalities if they are not
subject to genuine random allocation of the new drug. If
there is good reason to believe that the group receiving the
new treatment first would fare better than the group act-
ing as control, those with political power would have good
reason to rig the randomization process to make sure their
constituents get the treatment first. This also makes the ex-
acerbation of preexisting inequalities more likely, because
the population ofmore affluent districts might well bemore
politically active, consequently having more political influ-
ence over the allocation process.
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However, we would not necessarily expect, before
the trial, that any one arm would fare better than an-
other (Freedman 1987). This is because under conditions
of equipoise, we do not knowwhether the trial intervention
is better or worse than the control intervention. We could,
however, argue that we should not require equipoise in ran-
domized cluster trials. The requirement of equipoise is al-
ways very demanding, even in the context of conventional
RCTs. Scientists must have some reason for thinking that
the new treatment is superior to currently accepted treat-
ments; otherwise there would be no rationale for testing
and there would be no basis for calculating the necessary
sample size. The larger the cluster trial, the more resource
and organization it would take to coordinate and, wemight
think, the greater the belief in the new treatment required to
pursue it, moving the investigators further from the state of
equipoise.
Furthermore, we would require larger numbers of clus-
ters or larger expected treatment effects to gain adequate
statistical power. Estimating the sample size needed to show
a significant difference is complicated in cluster designs by
an intra-class correlation (measured by the intraclass cor-
relation coefficient [ICC]) (Ukoumunne et al. 1999). This is
due to the fact that the individuals belong to the same clus-
ter or group, defined by social or geographical boundaries.
They are likely to exhibit a degree of homogeneity, which
may influence the measure studied in the trial. Indeed, the
between-cluster variation will sometimes be larger than
the variation between individuals within a cluster. To
achieve the desired statistical power, scientists could in-
crease the total number of clusters (Ukoumunne et al. 1999),
or they could choose to test only those treatments for which
the anticipated effect is relatively large. By increasing the
number of clusters we would inevitably increase the total
number of human participants, which, in turn, might have
implications for fairness. This would subject a greater num-
ber of people to any trial-generated inequality. Increasing
the threshold for an intervention effect would increase the
size of the generated inequality. In a virulent and deadly
pandemic, we would be looking for the largest effect size
possible.
To compound these problems, the perception of group
inequalities is likely to be worse, especially in a pandemic.
Cluster trials may compound any issues of a “postcode lot-
tery” nature, where different local districts implement dif-
ferent substantive policies (Devlin 2008). They are unlikely
to form a new devolved political structure, which results in
a postcode lottery of treatment specifically for the disease
in a pandemic. This is because the delivery of the new treat-
ment will be determined by preexisting structures that gov-
ern the development of strategies of geographical contain-
ment. However, a CRCT that was centrally planned (e.g.,
by the World Health Organization [WHO] as the directing
authority for health within the United Nations) would not
be able to justify differentially implemented policies in or-
der to protect a greater right to the autonomy of individual
districts. One may appeal to autonomy to protect the right
of or group leaders to enroll their communities in research,
but not to protect the right of scientists to plan a cluster
trial centrally. If well-publicized cluster RCTs were seen as
socially unacceptable, this could hamper the entire public
health effort.
Human psychology, moreover, shows that the percep-
tion of risk is influenced by clustering biases. When asked
in several studies to compare different risky technologies,
lay people judged the same number of fatalities as more
serious when caused by a single accident (harming groups)
than when they are dispersed across several events (harm-
ing isolated individuals) (Vlek and Stallen 1981; Slovic et al.
1979; Slovic et al. 1980).More recently, Slovic and colleagues
showed that clustered risks from a single event are partic-
ularly problematic when the probabilities are largely im-
precise while exposure to those risks is uncontrollable and
potentially catastrophic (Slovic et al. 1984). These clustered
risks, however, can be made more acceptable with greater
anticipated benefits, especially to those clusters exposed to
the risks (Vlek and Stallen 1981). For these reasons, a cluster
trial of a promising new treatment may be seen as accept-
able on the grounds that the same group exposed to the
risk of the treatment also stands to benefit. However, it is
more likely that, in a pandemic, the risks of not receiving
anything would be seen to be problematic especially when
the effects of any inequality would be long-lasting or when
theywould be impossible to address afterwards (or through
the sequential delivery of treatment by cluster). By the time
the new treatment has been fully rolled out, many in some
acting control (allocated to delayed treatment) clusters may
have died. However, the number of deaths is likely to be far
fewer than if the treatment were first restricted to research,
and only then rolled out to the wider population.
In sum, as one of themainpoints behindmy thesis is that
research data can be collected, and processed, while rolling
out a new treatment to the population at large (rather than
artificially restricting access to it until after the results are
obtained through research, as currently regulated), it is dif-
ficult to say that clusters should be selected tomatch socioe-
conomic factors to avoid generating inequalities within the
trial. Those not selected as eligible would lose out. Rather,
the allocation of clusters, whatever their social status, could
be randomized if the process were genuine, without polit-
ical perversion, and there were sufficient epistemic uncer-
tainty surrounding its effects. In this way, members of the
public may hold sufficient trust in the research to accept
it. The degree of public trust could be assessed, hypotheti-
cally, in advance; there are alreadymechanisms for gauging
public opinion about medical research generally (National
Institutes of Health [NIH] 2005).
As soon as these drugs show promise and are evalu-
ated, however, the issue of manufacture comes to the fore
and relationships with industry will need to be negotiated,
assuming that any commercial manufacturing facilities are
not simply seized by government. The inescapable issue
of fairness discussed earlier could then be grossly com-
pounded by commercial exploitation. These relationships
are less easy to conceptualize but they could be governed,
in the event of a pandemic, by government.
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Commercial Interests
While the effect of commercial involvement is a consid-
eration that is not an integral part of research in a pan-
demic, assessment of its capacity to erode public trust in
a situation where trust is needed and commercial involve-
ment useful (if governed robustly) is a good (and obvious)
place to start. After the swine flu pandemic of 2009/2010,
Dame Deidre Hine was commissioned to review the UK
government’s response and specifically to examine the
strategies adopted by the devolved administrations. There
had been more than 800,000 cases of swine flu across the
United Kingdom and 457 deaths, including those of chil-
dren and pregnant women. The review put the total cost
of the pandemic at £1.2 billion, taking into account both
the preparation and response stages. The vast proportion of
that total, around £1 billion,went to pharmaceuticals,which
included the antiviral drug Tamiflu (the vaccine for swine
flu) and antibiotics.
While the review concluded that there was no overreac-
tion, it recommended that lessons be learned and showed
us that industry can drive a hard bargain with govern-
ment even in the midst of a public health crisis. One of
those lessons, for example, was that the UK Department of
Health should have negotiated a “break clause” in its con-
tract with drug company GlaxoSmithKline, to allow drug
and vaccine supply to be tailored to need. There was ini-
tially flexibility in the amount the United Kingdom could
purchase, ranging from30milliondoses to 132milliondoses
(which was enough to vaccinate the whole UK population
with two doses). However, once contracts had been signed,
the full consignment was purchased regardless of evolving
need.
There are signs, however, that the power of the phar-
maceutical giants is generally on the wane. Interestingly,
part of the U.S. National Institutes of Health investment
for translational medicine is in basic infrastructure to en-
able the closer collaboration of those researchers thought
important to the project. However, while government is
funding institutes for translational medicine, the pharma-
ceutical industries are closing their large research and de-
velopment facilities after several years with disappointing
results. The next big blockbusters, they suggest, will come
from smaller, more concentrated, groups. This may give
public authorities greater negotiating power when facilities
are needed to increase the pace of research in a pandemic.
An example of the reduced power of pharmaceutical com-
panies is the action of the Indonesian government, which
refused to hand over samples of the H5N1 avian influenza
virus to the WHO in 2007 unless its citizens were guar-
anteed access to any resulting vaccine, thereby creating a
global health governance crisis (Fidler 2008). And the In-
dian courts have recently issued a compulsory license or
treatment order that effectively defeats any patent advan-
tage a companymight use to charge abovewhat developing
countries can afford for treatments (Global Health Check
2012).
CONCLUSION
As the policies of social containment and drug discovery
are applied in a public health emergency, I have suggested
that regulators should consider ways in which access to
investigational new drugs could be expanded beyond the
policies laid out by the FDA after the AIDS epidemic in
the 1980s. With the emphasis on nonpharmaceutical meth-
ods of geographical and social containment and on what
observational or natural experiments are compatible with
them, wider access to new drugs may not mean losing sci-
entific evidence of safety. For example, cluster trials could
provide a way to evaluate new drugs and gather meaning-
ful scientific data while managing the spread of disease and
the wider distribution of new drugs. The effects of the new
treatments could be evaluated while they are being rolled
out to the population. Yet concern for fairness requires any
research be planned with ensuing group inequalities and
commercial exploitation in mind. Genuine randomization
of clusters and robust political systems help to address the
inescapable issue of fairness, while thosewith a duty of care
to individual patients are protected by policy. Commercial
interests should, to a large extent, be governed by govern-
ment.While we are free of the panic of a pandemic, it would
bewise to think through these questions, consider the views
of the public, and prepare policy for such an eventuality. 
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